RC/CA
Jun 20th, 2009 @ 7:57 pm
David Guttenfelder’s photos of Marines in Helmand.
Jun 19th, 2009 @ 7:55 pm
So how to best measure actual progress? The civilian fatality rate is clearly important — yet it is often a lagging indicator of changes in momentum. As important as reducing violence, therefore, is improving government institutions and the provision of services. This is hard to measure, but economic and quality of life indicators give some hint. (via Op-Chart - The States of Iraq and Afghanistan - Op-Ed - NYTimes.com)
Reblogged from brown cardboard boxes.
@ 7:50 pm
@ 7:47 pm
Warriors for Peace
The stories and emotions behind Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans who are now working for peace.
Cameron White deployed to Iraq twice. Before his first deployment he was in full support of the war. When he got there though, he found himself securing oil fields, causing him to wonder what the real intention of the mission was. After extensive research and re-education Cameron began working within the peace movement while still on active duty. He was introduced to Buddhism by a fellow soldier in Iraq, and upon returning from his second tour he began studying with Claude Anshin Thomas, a Vietnam veteran turned Buddhist monk. “Buddhism is about understanding the self. In the military the mentality that is encouraged is to do things without asking question and not look at the humanity involved and the consequences. What drew me to Buddhism and opened my eyes within the practice was realizing that I have to pay attention to what I am doing each and every moment because there are consequences to all the choices we make.” Cameron now works for Disabled American Veterans and sees his work as service to the world.
Cameron White, Iraq War Veterans from Los Angeles, CA.
Jun 18th, 2009 @ 5:00 pm
Benjamin Lowy: Iraq | Perspectives
Reblogged from YOU MIGHT FIND YOURSELF.
@ 4:59 pm
[via Chap]
@ 11:15 am
Clear, hold, and build. This is a strategy that both GEN Petraeus and GEN McChrystal have been talking about. The insurgents will respond by going elsewhere, of course. It's what insurgents do. In the meantime, establishing the local security apparatus and providing governmental and developmental improvements will help to prevent re-infiltration as the military effort eventually responds to the migration of the insurgency. However, the migratory opportunities for the insurgents are not unlimited. Migrating into a Hazara-dominated area, for instance, would be suicidal for Taliban unless done in significant strength. The Taliban insurgency would not do well attempting to migrate into the Panjshir Valley, either. The disposition of troops will eventually need to change, but in the meantime, having a General with the juice to say how things are to be done speaking of pushing out of the Big Box Hedgehogs is very significant.
@ 11:03 am
An Afghan refugee child hides from a dust storm behind a tent at a refugee camp in Kabul, Afghanistan on October 7, 2008. Over a quarter million Afghans have returned home this year from Pakistan and Iran, many of them reportedly due to economic and security uncertainties faced in exile, the United Nations said. (MANPREET ROMANA/AFP/Getty Images)
Reblogged from beautiful mess..
@ 11:02 am
Yeah, there should be a short list of stupid things not to do or say. But shouldn’t he just know that anyways?
From a commenter on Ghosts of Alexander. Weren’t we just talking about the alien and manifold cultures? This is the most basic of the most basic, but our seniormost diplomat in Afghanistan doesn’t know better. What does that say about our soldiers’ chances of getting it right?
On the other hand, it was just a gaffe.
Jun 17th, 2009 @ 10:46 pm
rootcausecorrectiveaction.com is dead (while I sort some things out with the domain registrar)! Long live rcca.tumblr.com!
@ 10:44 pm
There was a saying that we didn't fight in Vietnam for 10 years; we fought there for one year, 10 times.
How many times will we fight here for one year?
There are many changes Gen. McChrystal must make in order to have a chance at success, and this is one of them. Even we that are tired and on our last few weeks in country, ready to go home, acknowledge that the tours are too short for us to reach our potential. In Vietnam, soldiers were expected to adapt to guerilla fighting tactics in a foreign, tropical environment. I have no doubt that proficiency at warfighting was difficult to attain, but I’d say it was less challenging to achieve than it is in the current conflict.
Because it’s now so much more than warfighting. With COIN as our M.O., an organization for centuries devoted to the application of ordnance struggles to understand the application of diplomacy. The alien and manifold cultures of Afghanistan cannot be taught at Ft. Bragg. COIN is not really a tactic, it’s a way of thinking that doesn’t necessarily come naturally to combatants. A doctrine that demands more thoughtful analysis requires more immersive study.
I am not sure that McChrystal can foster continuity downrange from general staff, but I think it is a worthy pursuit. The American public might not be able to stomach longer deployments, but I think that my line of work would benefit immensely from rolling relief, where only a few positions turn over at a time. Continuity in this complicated strategic environment is worth sacrificing a bit of cohesion for.
@ 7:31 pm
“That’s probably the single hardest part about Afghanistan, is that this is the country with no Plan B. There’s barely a Plan A.”
Matthew A. Ritchie@ 7:30 pm
New numbers from military researchers disprove a popular saying among troops in Iraq and Afghanistan: If you were home, you could just as easily die in a car accident.
@ 7:30 pm
More at The Sacramento Bee.
Reblogged from divinedebris.
@ 3:07 pm
We know, relatively speaking, pretty much nothing about the acuracy of polling and surveys in Afghanistan. So the election? Your guess is as good as mine. There are no “experts” on this matter.
Ah, something to which I might speak somewhat intelligently.
Due to Taliban strong-arming, remoteness, and gender inequality, broad swaths of Afghanistan’s population will not have access to polls. Many will not vote out of fear or apathy or disillusionment. Those from Karzai’s tribe will certainly have the strongest sense of enfranchisement. And let’s not forget the pervasiveness of corruption.
My guess on the voter intentions poll: it does not accurately represent the whole of the Afghan public. My guess on the election: Karzai in the first round.
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