RC/CA

Jul 2nd, 2009 @ 6:50 am

I spent 20 months in Iraq, including 2006 as the political adviser to Gen. Peter Chiarelli, then operational commander of U.S. forces in the country. I traveled to nearly every outpost, talked to commanders at every level, from Tal Afar to Baghdad to Fallujah. Upon returning to the Pentagon in 2007, I grew increasingly uneasy with the disconnect between what I saw and knew of U.S. strategy in Iraq, and the way it was characterized and interpreted back in Washington.

U.S. forces are being increased, top aides to President Obama are said to be advocating a “civilian surge,” just as in Iraq, and counterinsurgency doctrine is again the proposed answer. But to what question? Washington’s ultimate objectives in Afghanistan remain unclear. The United States has spent six years, more than 4,000 American lives, mass quantities of psychic and political energy, and untold billions on the effort in Iraq — a project that has to date yielded little in a strategic sense. Iraq had an urban, educated population, infrastructure and bountiful natural resources, whereas Afghanistan has none of these. If “counterinsurgency” is merely a more palatable stand-in for “nation-building,” that politically freighted but strategically more illuminating term, then our terminology may be obscuring the true extent of our predicament.

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